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Abstract—Multipath routing is the use of multiple potential paths 
through a network in order to enhance fault tolerance, optimize 
bandwidth use, and improve security.  Selecting data flow paths 
based on cost addresses performance issues but ignores security 
threats. Attackers can disrupt the data flows by attacking the 
links along the paths. Denial-of-service, remote exploitation, and 
other such attacks launched on any single link can severely limit 
throughput. Networks can be secured using a secure quality of 
service approach in which a sender disperses data along multiple 
secure paths. In this secure multi-path approach, a portion of the 
data from the sender is transmitted over each path and the re-
ceiver assembles the data fragments that arrive. One of the larg-
est challenges in secure multipath routing is determining the se-
curity threat level along each path and providing a commensu-
rate level of encryption along that path. The research presented 
explores the effects of real-world attack scenarios in systems, and 
gauges the threat levels along each path. Optimal sampling and 
compression of network data is provided via compressed sensing. 
The probability of the presence of specific attack signatures along 
a network path is determined using machine learning techniques. 
Using these probabilities, information assurance levels are de-
rived such that security measures along vulnerable paths are 
increased.  
Keywords-component; Mutli-path Security;  Information 
Assurance; Anomaly Detection.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Typical network protocols select the least-cost path for 
routing data to destinations and thus address delivery efficiency 
along a single network path.  On networks using single-path 
routing, attackers can launch attacks upon any link which seri-
ously compromises data integrity, availability, and confidenti-
ality along the path. Network countermeasures required along a 
compromised path include TCP resets of the offending attack 
node or nodes and involves disrupting the flow of traffic on the 
path for a period of time, and switching to an alternate path. 
Nevertheless, deploying these countermeasures generally re-
quires manual intervention and an associated switching time 
[1]. Having multiple paths available for traffic propagation 
hinders an attacker’s ability to focus the attack on a single rout-
ing path.  However, multipath traffic propagation conversely 
introduces complexity into the system: using multiple paths 
requires sophisticated packet-reordering methods and buffering 
methods [2], [3]. In a fully secure multipath network a sender 
simultaneously transmits data over multiple paths with varying 
levels of security enabled along each path. The level of security 
along each path should reflect a measured threat level on the 
path and be dynamically adjusted as the attack environment 
varies. 
Despite the importance of associating and adjusting the se-
curity level to each path in multipath routing, existing multi-
path routing protocols such as Multipath TCP lack the ability to 
actively determine the level of security threats along a path [4], 
[31].  
In this paper, we present a novel approach that utilizes 
compressed sensing (CS) [13] and machine learning techniques 
to determine the information assurance level of network paths 
in multipath networks. Compressed sensing (CS) allows net-
work data to be optimally sampled below the normally required 
Nyquist 2X signal sampling frequency while simultaneously 
compressing data and lowering data dimensionality. CS data 
compression enables the storage of large data windows by up 
to a factor of 10X. The combination of data compression and 
data dimensionality reduction effectively filters out non-
contributing network traffic features which increases the effi-
ciency and data handling capabilities of anomaly detection al-
gorithms used in network path security determination. 
Compared to other types of multipath network security 
methods, the proposed approach is based on recognizing real-
world attack patterns within compressed and dimension re-
duced data sets. Additionally, most multipath security schemes 
are based on hypothetically derived trust models while the pro-
posed approach finds the likelihood of the presence of real-
world attack patterns in data event windows and assigns infor-
mation assurance levels to paths that can be subsequently uti-
lized to actively adjust path security measures [1-8].  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We 
provide in Section II a review of related work.  Section III 
presents the compressed sensing - signature cluster path secu-
rity determination methods. In section IV evaluation results 
are presented, and finally in section V conclusions are dis-
cussed.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
In multipath routing, data is transmitted along multiple 
paths to prevent fixed unauthorized nodes from intercepting or 
injecting malicious data onto a network. Ideally, the simplest 
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form of multipath routing entails using no encryption and data 
is split among different routes in order to minimize the effects 
of malicious nodes. The approach in [5] uses existing multiple 
paths such that an intruder needs to spread resources across 
several paths to seriously degrade data confidentiality.  In the 
approach of [6], one path is used as a central path while the 
other paths are alternatives. When the central path’s perfor-
mance is seriously affected, one of the alternative paths is se-
lected as the new central path. These two multipath protocols 
base the effectiveness on the ability to either disperse data 
along multiple paths or in having the option to switch to alter-
nate paths. However, none of the approaches suggests an ade-
quate or explicit means for combining dispersive data security 
methods with path differentiating data security measures.  
The differentiating approach proposed in this paper is to in-
telligently sense the threat level present along each network 
path and correspondingly increase the encryption strength on 
more vulnerable paths while decreasing it on the less vulnera-
ble ones. In order to maintain overall throughput, the transmis-
sion rates on more vulnerable paths will drop, while it will 
increase on the less vulnerable ones. The proportional multi-
path encryption and routing approach is expressed in Eq. (1) 
and maintains a secure quality of service (SQoS). Packets are 
proportionally routed over paths Pi and Pj  according to values 
I, C, E over graph edges, which are defined shortly.  
III. NETWORK PATH SECURITY DETERMINATION 
    Given a network, let I be the information assurance fac-
tor, C be the link cost factor (i.e., OSPF cost), and E be the 
encryption scaling factor.  For distinct edges or links in a net-
work, the values of these factors are different. To differentiate 
the factor values on different links, we use subscript i to de-
note the factor value for an edge ei. E.g., Ii is the information 
assurance factor for an edge ei. Given a message with length L, 
we need to formulate the throughput for sending this message 
from a source node vs to a destination node ve when using mul-
tipath routing by leveraging these factors. In general, if all 
paths that are used to send a message is |P|, and the length of a 
path Pi is ni, then the throughput is defined as follows.    
                            ∑ ∑          
  
   
   
                       (1) 
For example, assume that the network routing algorithm 
decides to use two paths Pi = path (v1, v6, v3, v4, v2) and Pj = 
path (v1, v6, v5, v7, v2) to send a message with length L from v1 
to v2 in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Multipath Graph  
Then, its throughput is:  
 
 
 
The throughput to destination vertex “ve” is maintained, but 
the encryption “E” scaling factors are dynamically adjusted 
according to the values of the information assurance factor I 
over each edge.  
It will be shown that the information assurance factors I 
along a path can be derived by finding the likelihood of the 
presence of attack signature patterns within a defined event 
window of network traffic (Section III.D). Link encryption 
factors E and link cost factors C are inversely proportional to 
the value of information assurance factors I. Derivation of 
factors E and C in maintaining SQoS and throughput T
vs→ve 
 is 
reserved for future research.  
Our approach determines the security levels of network paths 
by examining the traffic data with different temporal parti-
tions. In particular, the network traffic is partitioned into event 
windows where each window collects data over 30 minute 
sampling periods. For each 30-minute event window, we col-
lect N sample from the network traffic for a single path.      
For each event window, our approach performs traffic sam-
pling, anomaly detection, and path security determination as 
shown in the diagram of Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Processing Flow for Traffic in One Event Window 
 
As Figure 2 shows, compressed sensing (CS) [13] is used 
to optimally sample network traffic data and store them in a 
compressed form (Section III.A). Behavioral anomaly detec-
tion is conducted on the CS data (Section III.B and Section 
III.C). The compressed data are passed to the path security 
determination process (Section III.D), which performs cluster 
analysis on the traffic samples. Significant clusters are in-
spected for the presence of active attack signature features, 
and the likelihood of a respective cluster containing attack 
signatures is calculated (Section III.D). Given the likelihood of 
specific attack features being present on a path Pi, the cyber 
threat level Wr and information assurance Ii, are determined 
using Eq. (13) and Eq. (14), which are discussed in Section 
III.E. In what follows, we discuss every step of Figure 2 in 
detail.  
 
 
1. Find active features of 
interest. 
2. Find likelihood of the 
presence of attack signa-
tures. 
3. Determine information 
assurance factor on path. 
 Traffic Sampling          Anomaly Detection                  Determine Path Security 
           (CS)                          (CS-PCA Based)                          (Cluster Analysis) 
      T
v1→v2
    ∑   
           L ∑   
  
                          (2) 
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A. Traffic Sampling 
 
Network packet header, network time, port, protocol, and 
flags are collected at each router interface. An event window 
corresponds to a set of TCP/IP packet records for a path transit-
ing a set of subnets or virtual LANs (VLAN) contained within 
an autonomous system.  
For each event window, we first define several notations 
used in the process of data sampling and the later discussions.  
 f: one feature that is abstracted from the network packet 
records. When there are multiple features, we also use fi to 
denote the i-th feature. 
 Nf: the total number of features that are of our interest.  In 
this research, a total of 19 features were extracted from the 
captured network packets. These features correspond to a 
specific subset of TCP, ICMP, HTTP, OSPF protocol 
states which are most often associated with router and host 
attacks.  
 Xf: samples for a feature f in one event window. It records 
the number of samples of feature f at different sample mo-
ment. If there are N sample moments, then X is an N–
dimensional column vector.  
 N: the number of samples that we take for one event win-
dow.  
 Φ = (X1, X2, … XNf): a N×N
f
 matrix with the N samples that 
are taken for an event window. Here, Xi is represented as a 
N-dimensional column vector.  
 
Three separate network based suits, namely reconnaissance, 
vulnerability scanning, and exploitation, were used in emulat-
ing real-world host and network conditions. Each suite pos-
sesses a unique signature (Sr). The threat level (Wr) is assigned 
to each attack suite type, which ranges from 1 for least severe 
to 5 for most severe. Table 1 shows the detailed information of 
the network attack suites that we used in this research.  
 
Both compressed and uncompressed data in event windows 
were used in the analysis. Compressed data in event windows 
were created by sampling the uncompressed data in the corre-
sponding event window.     
B. Data Compression Using Compressed Sensing 
 
Compressed data for each event window are calculated us-
ing the CS technique [12, 13]. The theory of the CS technique 
is explained as follows.  
Compressed sensing relations are listed below. For the ob-
served data x ∈ RN with Q representing the number of non-
zero elements. The value of Q is determined by finding those 
vectors where the sum of the absolute values of the columns is 
minimum. This otherwise known as the L-1 norm and repre-
sented by       1.  
                1  subject to Y = Uv x                                                      (3) 
In Eq. (3) Uv ∈ R
M×N  
is an M×N orthogonal matrix called the 
sensing or measurement matrix, v is a random subset of the row 
indices, and Y is the linearly transformed compressed data. 
We note that the |V| = M and dictates the level of compres-
sion which is afforded when the linear transformation is per-
formed on Φ .     
                       |V| ≥  Const · µ2(U)·Q · log N                     (4) 
 
                 ( )            |                                   (5) 
Y = Uv x is a linear transformation reducing the data dimen-
sionality from N to M with Uv columns normalized to unit 
norm. If the sparseness of x is considered, a dimension k repre-
sents the components with high variance, and M is chosen such 
that M  ≥  k. 
From Eq. (4), the CS sampling rate which yields the best 
results is captured in Eq. (6) where ԑ is a constant proportional 
to the number of active features and M is the number of sam-
ples to be taken.                    
                                        √                                  (6)     
 
C. Anomaly Detection 
 
The previous step calculates the compressed data Y from the 
original traffic data Φ for each event window. Our anomaly 
detection component detects the event windows that may con-
tain traffic with anomalous behavior. In this section, we first 
describe the detailed steps of this component. Then, we explain 
the theory behind each step.  
    The anomaly detection component works as follows. The 
first step performs Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the 
compressed data from one event window. I.e., PCA is per-
formed on a covariance matrix of Y. The second step applies a 
residual analysis over the original data Φ and calculates a 
squared prediction error. If the prediction error for one feature 
is bigger than a threshold, then that event window is considered 
to contain anomalous behavior.   
The compressed event window is represented by Y in Eq. 
(7). 
Table 1   Network Attack Suites  
Suite 
Signature 
( Sr) 
 Description Active      
Features 
Threat 
Level 
(Wr) 
1 Cloud Guest Recon-
naissance, Vulnera-
bilities & Exploita-
tion 
6 
{f1, f2, f3, 
f4, f9, f11} 
3 
2 Cloud Infrastructure 
Reconnaissance, Vul-
nerabilities & Exploi-
tation 
6 
{f1, f5, f6, 
f7, f8, f9} 
5 
3 Cloud Services Re-
connaissance, Vul-
nerabilities & Exploi-
tation 
5 
{f1, f5, f8, 
f9, f10} 
4 
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                                                                                                            (7) 
The sampling matrix    projects   to a residual subspace; 
however, eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance matrix of 
x and Y yields near-identical eigenvalue magnitudes from 
which anomaly detection can be derived [10]. This fact allows 
one to inspect the compressed data samples, Y, for anomalies 
reducing the computational complexity to  (  ) and storage 
of the data to  (  ) with   (     )  This is a substan-
tial running time reduction of the PCA analysis over the covar-
iance matrix of x, which requires  (  )  computations and 
memory storage of  (  )   
A residual analysis method [9] decomposes the observed 
data x (in our case, one row vector in Φ) into principal sub-
space which is believed to govern the normal characteristics. 
Within the residual subspace in which Y resides, abnormal 
characteristics can be found. The residual method performs the 
eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance matrix of   from 
which k principle eigenvectors E are obtained. The projection 
of a data instance   onto the residual subspace is  
                                 z = (I – EET)                                         (8) 
Assuming the data is normal, the squared prediction error 
is     
  which follows a non-central chi-square distribution.  
Anomalous activity is detected when the squared prediction 
error     
  exceeds a certain threshold called Q-statistics which 
is the function of the non-principle eigenvalues in the residual 
subspace and is approximated by 
                       [
  √     
 
  
  
    (    )
  
  ]
 
  
                     (9) 
where       
      
  
 ,       ∑   
  
    for i = 1, 2, 3,    
(   ) percentile in a standard normal distribution and   , 
and λj, i = 1,…., k are the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. 
Anomalies are detected when the prediction error     
      . 
[9]  
D. Determination of Path Security 
 
Using the approach discussed in Section III.C, volume-
based anomalous behavior within an event window is identi-
fied. Such anomalous behavior provides an indication that an 
attack may exist within this event window. If anomalous be-
havior exists in an event window with high probability, then 
this component attempts to determine the security level for 
paths in this event window by using hierarchical clustering 
techniques described in this section. 
Agglomerative hierarchical clustering was chosen as the 
method for deriving anomalous and baseline models because of 
its ability to identify clusters without providing an initial esti-
mate of the number of clusters present. Agglomerative hierar-
chical clustering algorithm iteratively groups data points or 
clusters of points to form new clusters. Each iteration results in 
the previously found points and clusters being clustered with 
another point or cluster. Generally, the results of hierarchical 
clustering of sizable data sets are a large number of clusters, 
many of which contain a small fraction of the samples. A 
straightforward approach to prioritizing clusters is to eliminate 
the minor clusters by cutting the hierarchical dendrogram lower 
tiers.  
Once clusters are identified in an event window (Algorithm 
1), determination of which clusters contain attack signature 
features of high magnitude is conducted (Algorithm 1). The 
path information assurance factor is calculated (Algorithm 2). 
In order to lower computational complexity, only those 
event windows found to have volumetric anomalies in the re-
sidual subspace are used in determining network path security. 
The relative magnitudes and spectral properties of each feature 
in principal subspace are calculated, and the uncompressed 
form of each anomalous event window is analyzed. A signature 
consisting of a distinct collection of significant features is asso-
ciated with each attack suite; thus, the nature of significant fea-
tures contained within the traffic data of an event window is 
captured in a hierarchical clustering as illustrated in Figure 3.   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Hierarchical Clustering of Data Event Windows, vertical 
axis distance, horizontal axis cluster number.  
 
Algorithm 1 is used to generate the clustering dendrogram 
as illustrated in Figure 3. Algorithm 1 implements a modified 
hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm that merges 
clusters until a minimum distance threshold between clusters 
is reached or all the clusters are merged to only one.  When a 
minimum distance threshold is used, the algorithm ensures 
maximum partitioning of data into feature-rich clusters and 
increases the probability that the top-tier clusters contain a full 
attack signature feature set.  
 
Algorithm 1 takes as input (1) SSigattack, the set of attack sig-
natures, each of which consists of several features, (2) Φ with 
the N samples, where each sample is a row vector in Φ, and 
(3) δ, the distance threshold to stop cluster merging. This algo-
rithm groups the samples in one event window to c clusters 
(Lines 3-8). Then, for each cluster, it finds the attack signature 
that has the highest probability to match the cluster’s features 
(Lines 10-21). The signatures and matching probabilities for 
all the clusters are put into SSig and PProb respectively. This 
algorithm outputs a triple (C, SSig, PProb) where C[i] is the i-
th derived cluster, SSig[i] contains the attack signature with 
the highest probability (in PProb[i]) to match C[i]’s features.  
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    In this algorithm, c represents the total number of clusters 
found so far, and is initialized to 0 (Line 2). Di is a cluster that 
is being processed. Initially, Di is initialized to contain the i-th 
sample in one event window. C is the set of clusters finally 
derived, and is initialized as an empty set.  
  
        Algorithm 1:  SignatureMatchProb(SSigattack, Φ, δ) 
 
1  begin 
2   initialize c = 0; C={}; D = {Di, …, DN} where Di  is the  i-th sample;  
3      do /*merge cluasters*/ 
4           c = c + 1 
5           find the two nearest clusters Di and Dj from D 
6           merge Di and Dj to a new cluster and insert the new cluster to C 
7         until dist(Di, Dj) > δ 
8      end do 
9      i = 0; PProb={}; SSig={}; 
        /* for each cluster, find the attack signature  
             which matches this cluster’s features with the highest probability*/ 
10    for each cluster Di ( C) do  
11           k=0; maxProbi=0; maxProbSigi ={}; 
12          for each attack signature Sk ( SSigattack) 
13               Hi = extract features from Di that also exist in Sk  
14               Ni = # of Hi feature with conditional entropy higher than H(F) 
15               Nk = # features in Sk 
16               if(Ni/ Nk> maxProbi)  
17               maxProbi= Ni/ Nk 
18                maxProbSigi = Sk 
19               end if 
20  k = k + 1 
21          end for  
22         PProb = PProb  {maxProbi} 
23         SSig = SSig  {maxProbSigi} 
24         i = i+1;  
26    end for 
27    return (C, SSig, PProb); 
28  end 
 ________________________________________________________ 
Lines 3-8 merges samples to c significant clusters. This cluster 
merging process stops when the minimum distance between 
two nearest clusters exceeds the distance threshold δ. In find-
ing the nearest clusters from all the existing ones, both Ward 
and complete linkage methods can be utilized. Past research 
[20] showed that the complete linkage method Eq. (10) yields 
the best ratio between the within group sum of squares 
(WGSS) and between groups sum of squares (BGSS); thus, 
indicating tighter grouping between inter-cluster members and 
optimal cluster-to-cluster spacing.  
 
      (     )       (     )     Di ,     Dj }              (10) 
 
For each cluster Di out of the c clusters in C, Lines 10-21, 
calculate the probability that its features match every attack 
signature. The details of the signature matching are omitted in 
the algorithm for simplicity purpose. We discuss the details 
here. Identifying feature matches is performed by measuring 
the entropy for each feature within an event window. As Fig-
ure 4 indicates, the entropy of an individual significant feature 
fj increases when attack suite traffic is injected into the net-
work.  
  
 
 
Figure 4: Features and entropy relationships.  
 
The average entropy for features in the baseline traffic H(F) 
is  
 
     ( )   ∑     (  )   
  
   
    (  )                         (  ) 
 
The average conditional entropy for features in anomalous 
traffic is 
  
 (     
 
)   ∑     (    
 
 
)        (    
 
 
)
  
   
 (12) 
 
It is important to only classify valid clusters. Only clusters 
with active feature frequencies greater than 2% of the total 
number of samples in an event window become candidates for 
classification. In addition, of the candidate clusters those with 
the largest cophenetic distances and highest inconsistency fac-
tor are selected for feature entropy comparisons.  
A feature f’k appearing in anomalous traffic is significant 
if H(F’|   ) is greater than H(F). Significant features are sub-
sequently used in determining the probability that a cluster is 
associated with a specific attack suite 
 
 D1 D2 D5 D9 
f1 x x x x 
f2 x x x x 
f3  x x x 
f9 x   x 
 
Figure 5: Attack Signature Matching Probabilities 
 
Let us look at an example for signature matching proba-
bilities. Assume that we are given an attack signature Sk ( 
SSigattack) which consists of four features, f1, f2, f3, f9, i.e., Sk 
={f1, f2, f3, f9}. Algorithm 1 finds clusters and extracts the fea-
tures that exist in Sk. As shown in Figure 5, for candidate clus-
ters D1, D2, D5 and D9, the algorithm founds matching features 
H1 ={f1, f2, f9}, H2 ={f1, f2, f3}, H5 ={f1, f2, f3}, and H9 ={f1, f2, 
f3, f9}. They all have high (>=75%) feature matches to Sk. 
Among these four clusters, D9 has the highest feature match 
probability (100%). I.e., all the four features in the attack sig-
nature Sk exist in cluster.  
After calculating the signature matching probability 
(Lines 13-16), the attack signature with the highest feature-
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matching probability is recorded by maxProbSigi (Line 18) 
and the matching probability is recorded by maxProbi (Line 
17). When the highest matching probability maxProbi and the 
matching attack signature maxProbSigi for each cluster is 
found, they are put into sets PProb and SSig, respectively 
(Line 22-23). 
 
E. Calculate Assurance Level for a Path  
 
Once the set of clusters C are derived and probabilities of 
the presence of specific signatures in those clusters (PProb 
and SSig) are calculated, the path information assurance factor 
Ii for network path Pi is calculated using Eq. (13) and Eq. (14). 
Based on domain specific cyber security threat models [30], 
for each cyber threat level Wi, and a corresponding traffic 
threat signature Si present in an event window, the likelihood 
of cyber threat signatures being present is high if both Wi and 
Prob(Si) are high. For a path Pi , which consists of c clusters 
(discovered in the previous step),  we can sum up the threat for 
each cluster (Eq. (13)). Then the information assurance factor 
Ii for Pi is derived using Eq. (14):  
 
                       ∑        (  )
 
                                        (13) 
 
                                      
 
  
                                                (14) 
 
 Algorithm 2 calculates the information assurance factor I 
for a path by utilizing Eq. (13) and (14).  
 
Algorithm 2: PathInfoAssuranceLevel(C, SSig, PProb, Wr) 
1  initialize O = 0; i=1;  
2  begin  
3      for the i-th cluster Di in C  
4          Calculate its corresponding threat level Wi using  
                    its attack signature Si ( SSig) and threat level Wr    
5          Get its highest feature-matching probability Probi ( PProb) 
6          O = O + Wi × Probi     /* According to Eq. (12) */ 
7          i = i + 1 
8      end for 
9      I = 1/O /* According to Eq. (14) */ 
10    return I 
11  end 
 ________________________________________________________ 
The path information assurance factor Ii is calculated in Line 
9.  
 
F. Summary of Methodology 
 
As mentioned in Section III.A, a total of 19 features were 
extracted from the packet records. Network traffic, which con-
sists of the packet records, is partitioned into 30-minute event 
windows. For each 30-minute event window, a traffic feature 
frequency matrix Φ is extracted to contain the samples of the 
19 features. 
Algorithm 3 summarizes the complete algorithm to calcu-
late the information assurance measurement I for each event 
window. It takes three parameters as input. The first parameter 
is the N×N
f
 sample matrix Φ for an event window. Its traffic 
data is composed of the baseline traffic and anomalies. The 
second parameter is the set of attack threat signature SSigattack. 
It consists of S signatures. The third parameter is the threat 
level Wr. 
        Algorithm 3:  PathInfoAssurance(Φ, SSigattack, Wr) 
   
1   Uv ← GetSensingMatrix(N, M) 
 2         Y  ← CSSample(U, M, Φ
 
) /* Section III.A*/ 
 3         {Z1, …., ZNf } ←  DetectAnomalies(Φ, Y) /* Section III.B*/ 
 4         if  Zi ({Z1, …., ZNf}) s.t.      
  >    then 
 5             (C, SSig, PProb) ← SignatureMatchProb (Φ, SSigattack, δ) /*Alg. 1*/ 
 6            I ← PathInfoAssuranceLevel(C, SSig, PProb, Wr) /*Alg. 2 */ 
 7            Store(Y) 
 8         else 
 9              Store(Y) 
 10       end if 
  _______________________________________________________ 
 
The algorithm works as follows. In Line 1, the sampled da-
ta (feature frequency matrix) Φ is used to generate a CS sens-
ing matrix Uv (, which is a M×N matrix). In Line 2, Φ and the 
sensing matrix Uv are multiplied to produce Y, an M×N
f
 matrix 
using Eq. (3). In Line 3, the volume-based anomaly detection is 
performed on each column of the Y matrix, and the correspond-
ing prediction error     
  is returned. In Line 4, if there exists 
any feature’s prediction error     
  >Qβ, it means that there is 
the likelihood that attack signatures are present in Φ. Then, Φ 
is analyzed for the presence of attack signatures (Line 5). Oth-
erwise, the event window that produces Φ is determined to 
have a low probability of containing malicious content and is 
stored in compressed form for possible future analysis. In Line 
5, the signature-matching component is called to determine the 
probability of the presence of specific attack signatures in this 
event window. It produces the attack signatures SSig, data clus-
ters C, with highest signature presence of PProb. In Line 6, the 
information assurance value I for a path Pi is calculated using 
the set of signatures SSig, and their corresponding matching 
probability (in PProb) to attack signatures.  
G. Complexity and Efficiency Gains 
 
The overall computational complexity of PathInfoAssur-
ance expressed in Big O notation is as follows.  Let N be the 
number of samples, θ be the number of non-sparse compo-
nents, c be the number of clusters, S be the number of attack 
signatures, and   (     ). 
 
GetSensingMatrix    (      )  
CSSample     (      )  
DetectAnomalies     (  )   
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SignatureMatchProb    (       ) 
PathInfoAssuranceLevel    ( ) 
 
The following assumptions are considered when performing 
complexity analysis: 
 
1. The number of signatures S can grow very large. 
2. DetectAnomalies and its predecessors must always be 
run in order to detect zero-day attack behaviors within 
an event window. 
3. The accuracy of DetectAnomalies is assumed high 
enough that SignatureMatchProb is executed only 
when anomalies are detected. 
 
Taking into consideration that M and c are small while N is 
very large, the computational complexity lies primarily in Get-
SensingMatrix, CSSample , and SignatureMatchProb. As it is 
assumed that DetectAnomalies and its predecessors must pro-
cess each event window, the principal savings come when no 
anomalies are detected and it is subsequently unnecessary to 
call SignatureMatchProb.  
 
IV. RESULTS  
In this section, Section IV.A presents the strategies to collect 
traffic data and analyzes the characteristics of the network traf-
fic. Section IV.B discusses the effect of applying the CS tech-
nique. Section IV.C then shows the accuracy of our presented 
approach. Section IV.D explains the gains in running time of 
our approach.  
A. Characterization of Sample Data 
 
The goal of this research was to accurately model threats 
encountered by modern cloud service providers and clients. 
The most often used data sets, DARPA/Lincoln Labs packet 
traces [26], [27] and the KDD Cup data set derived from them 
[28], are found to be inadequate for such modeling as they are 
both over a decade old and do not contain modern threats. 
These data sets containing synthetic data that do not reflect 
contemporary attacks, and have been studied so extensively 
that members of the intrusion detection community find them 
to be insignificant [29]. For these reasons, the data sets used in 
this research consists of contemporary cloud service provider 
attacks generated on large scale test networks. 
In order to establish the ground truth to evaluate the accura-
cy of anomaly detection, we conducted an analysis of the traf-
fic in a baseline event window B, which is free of attacks, and 
the same window’s traffic Φ, which is injected with attack data. 
In particular, the baseline traffic event windows B without 
anomalies were fully sampled and descriptive statistics (e.g., 
mean, standard deviation, correlations) were calculated. Then, 
router and host node attacks were singly launched on the net-
work where they were fully sampled. Descriptive statistics and 
signatures for each attack were calculated. This information 
established the ground truth for later analysis. The router and 
host attacks were injected into the baseline data in a random 
Poisson distribution to form anomalous event windows Φ. 
Compressed event windows were assembled via compressed 
sensing of individual anomalous event windows.   
We analyzed the characteristics of the normal baseline traf-
fic data B and the traffic data with injected malicious traffic Φ. 
This analysis was conducted prior to CS sampling and subse-
quent path information assurance level determination. Exam-
ples of 30-minute event windows for B and Φ are shown in 
Figures 6 and 7. For the event window B with normal traffic 
(i.e., baseline), we plotted in Figure 6 the percentage of the 
frequencies of principal features. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Baseline Data Free of Attacks (B),  
              vertical axis percentage, horizontal samples.  
 
These features are ICMP redirect (feature f1), HTTP reset 
(feature f2), and synchronization (feature f3) packets. 
 
Table 2   Principal Features  for Baseline  Network Traffic  
Feature                                 Indicator 
f1                               ICMP Redirect 
f2                               TCP http [RST] 
f3                               TCP http [SYN, ACK] 
 
The principal features for the baseline data (in normal traf-
fic) all showed a large measure of variance over the sampling 
period. The large variance measurements indicate that these 
features can be adequately sensed during the CS sampling pro-
cess. For the traffic data Φ in an event window with anomalous 
behavior, we plotted the percentage of major features in Figure 
7. 
 
Figure 7: Baseline Data Plus Injected Attacks (Φ),  
          vertical axis percentage, horizontal samples.  
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Figure 7 shows that the number of significant features in Φ 
increased, due to the addition of abnormally high Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP), HTTPS, OSPF, and SSH protocol 
traffic resulting from router and host attack network traffic. 
Figure 7 also shows that the variance for each feature is also 
relatively high which indicate that CS sampling can effectively 
capture data patterns. 
 
Table 3   Principle Features for Network Traffic 
with Attacks  
Feature                        Indicator 
f1               ICMP Redirect 
f2               TCP http [RST] 
f3               TCP http [SYN, ACK] 
f6               TCP bgp [RST, ACK] 
f7               TCP ospf-lite [RST, ACK] 
f9               TCP https [RST, ACK] 
f11               TCP ssh [RST, ACK] 
f12               TCP telnet [RST, ACK] 
 
Attack signature data was characterized prior to pro-
cessing. A router attack signature is shown in Figure 8, which 
indicates that features f2, f6, f7, and  f9 are significant features. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Router Attack Signature, 
                     vertical axis percentage, horizontal samples.  
  
B. Effect of Compressed Sensing (CS) 
 
Using FFT generated frequency components of Φ to gen-
erate the sampling matrix   , the restricted isometric constant 
(RIC) δk with θ representing non-sparse components, was kept 
very small. Keeping δk small guaranteed good linear transfor-
mation of Φ and high orthogonality of columns in   . 
 
     (     )    
   ≤        
   (     )    
                    (15) 
 
The dimension M was optimally determined by using Eq. 
(6), and the error rate was measured.  Because    is highly 
orthogonal, the geometry preserving properties allow for the 
detection of volumetric anomalies in the residual subspace. 
The largest eigenvalues constituting 90% of the spectral pow-
er. With a probability of 1- conf where conf ( [0,1]) is the 
confidence interval, the changes in the eigenvalues between 
residual (ᴈi) and principle (λi) subspaces equal to | λi - ᴈi | and 
are bound by: 
             √   (√
  
 
  √
   
 
    
 
)             (16) 
Where    is the largest eigenvalue found in the residual sub-
space, i = 1,.., nv. 
        The false alarm rate ∆F is bound by:  
                        (√
  
 
  √
   
 
    
 
)                                 (17) 
Traditionally, the confidence threshold 90% is used which 
makes the √   
 
    
 term small when compared to√
  
 
. Thus, 
a smaller M increases the probability of a false alarm and also 
increases the compression error rate [10]. The obvious ad-
vantage in using a smaller M was a lower computational over-
head. Accordingly, M was chosen such that the intrinsic 
sparseness of   represented by   √  in Eq. (6) yields the 
lowest compression error with   √          
The optimal derivation of the constant   in Eq. (6) was 
achieved by identifying those feature components of x that had 
the highest variance and magnitudes. The value of   was found 
to be directly proportional to the number of active features. 
The compression mean squared error (MSE) was verified by 
measuring the error contained in convex optimized reconstruc-
tion.  
 
 
Figure 9: CS Reconstruction, Baseline + Injected Attacks  
  (G ← Y), vertical axis frequency, horizontal samples. 
 
  
(a)  M/N vs. % MSE (b) M/N vs. Exe Time (Sec) 
 
Figure 10: Compression ratio M/N versus MSE where N is the 
number of samples (without CS) and M is the number of sam-
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ples (with CS) (a) Recovered data fidelity and (b) Execution 
Time.    
  
Figure 11 shows the     
  values calculated from the base-
line and anomalous event windows.  
 
  
(a)  Baseline (b)  Anomalous 
 
Figure 11: Detected Anomalies: QB – horizontal line Q-Statistics 
threshold; horizontal axis represents network traffic features; vertical 
axis     
 
.  
 
The     
  values for the baseline network traffic features 
are all less than the QB, Q-Statistics threshold indicating an 
absence of network attack traffic (a). Figure 11(b) shows     
  
values which is greater than QB indicating an increase in the 
number and magnitude of network traffic attack features and a 
high possibility that network attack traffic is present in the 
event window. 
Table 4 shows the relationships exhibited between opti-
mally derived values for M, associated error, false positive 
alarm rate, and execution time for a 24 hour testing period 
with attack suites 1-3 randomly injected in a Poisson distribut-
ed. Each of the 3 attack suites discussed in Table 1 was ana-
lyzed resulting in an average effective anomaly detection per-
formance greater than 93%.  
 
Table 4    Anomaly Detection Accuracy 
 
Attack 
Suite 
 
No. of 
instances  
 
Detected  
 
False 
Pos. 
 
False 
Neg. 
1      5269   4894 12 10 
2      8020   7575 24 27 
3      2920   2802 12 5 
 
C. Overall Accuracy 
 
The following table summarizes the observed accuracy of 
Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 in correctly detecting event window 
anomalies and in performing subsequent classifications.   
 
Table 5     Cluster Signature Probability Accuracy 
 
Attack 
 
No. of 
 
   No. of 
 
 Classified  
 
Avg. Threat 
Suite Attack 
instances 
 
Forwarded 
   Attack 
instances 
Instances 
with 
> 90% 
Confidence  
Measure 
% Accura-
cy 
1      5269   4894     4635 87.96% 
2      8020   7575 7194     89.70% 
3      2920   2802 2703     93.14% 
 
Out of a total of 16,209 attack instances, residual sub-
space anomaly detection correctly sensed 94.21% and for-
warded those attack instances for subsequent classification. 
From the set of forwarded attack instances, Algorithm 1 cor-
rectly classified 95.16% with an average confidence greater 
than 90%. In total, the DetectAnomalies-SignatureMatchProb 
chain identified an average of 90.27% of all attack instances 
injected along network paths with an average probability of 
correct match greater than 90%.   
 
D. Efficiency 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the efficiency gains derived when 
SignatureMatchProb is not called. The vertical axis represents 
the execution time in seconds while the horizontal axis repre-
sents the ID of the data sets presented to the system. To illus-
trate the efficiency gains, each data set was presented to the 
chain initially without removing non-anomalous event win-
dows. Then the same data set was presented to the chain, but 
allowing non-anomalous windows to be dropped prior to clas-
sification. In the case of first data set, two out of the four event 
windows were dropped, which leads to the corresponding effi-
ciency gain of 50% in the signature classification phase. Simi-
lar efficiency gains were recorded for all data sets.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: CS Anomaly detection and Signature Classification: 
horizontal axis represents tested data sets; vertical axis is run 
time in seconds.  
 
Summarizing, an acceptably high percentage of attack in-
stances were detected by anomaly detection (94.21%) of 
which 95.16% of these forwarded instances were associated 
with attack suite signatures with high confidence. Overall effi-
ciency gains of over 50% were observed when non-anomalous 
event windows are dropped prior to classification. Additional-
ly, using this unique combination of methods, the information 
assurance factor Ii on any path Pi was derived with greater 
than 90% confidence. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we studied the problem of determining the in-
formation assurance level for different paths in multipath net-
works. We showed it was possible to intelligently sense and 
quantify threats along individual paths with a high degree of 
confidence. In the process, we devised a novel approach that 
combines optimal network data sampling (CS) with residual 
subspace PCA anomaly detection and probabilistic signature-
based intrusion detection. This methodology was shown to 
simultaneously compress sampled network traffic and reduce 
data dimensionality by filtering out non-contributing network 
traffic features. On the compressed and dimension-reduced data 
set, our approach efficiently performs path threat detection and 
classification. This approach increases the efficiency and data 
handling capabilities of both the anomaly and signature-based 
detection algorithms. 
We also derived a theoretical multipath SQoS relation, Eq. 
(1). This relationship allows for the dynamic adjustment of 
security measures along each path and maintains the overall 
throughput at the same time. The determination of the security 
measures using our newly developed approach solves the most 
technically challenging portion of the multipath SQoS relation 
Eq. (1). Our approach and the multipath SQoS relations lay a 
solid foundation for the future expansion of adaptive multipath 
security approaches.   
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